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RECOGNISING FAMILY DIVERSITY:  THE ‘BOUNDARIES’ OF Re. G 




ABSTRACT:  In Re. G, the Court of Appeal awarded a joint residence order to the 
appellant, who was the lesbian ex-partner of the child’s full biological mother.  The 
award also indirectly vested the appellant, a social parent, with parental responsibility 
and extended a body of case-law to same-sex couples, which had until now only been 
applied to heterosexual couples.  In the first part of this note I detail the facts and 
specific legal issues of the case, elaborating on some derivative issues relating 
especially to social parents and the parental responsibility framework under the 
Children Act 1989.  In this context I put forward a defined test of ‘parental fitness’ 
(which focuses on active ‘care’ as its central consideration) for social parents who 
must appeal to the court’s discretion to obtain parental responsibility.  In the second 
part of the note, I discuss the positive aspects of Re. G, but simultaneously offer some 
reservations.  These reservations revolve around a critique of law’s preference for the 
‘sexual family’ and I argue that while the legal recognition of ‘family diversity’ and 
parenthood remains modeled on this ‘sexual family’, the relaxation of family 
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 the Court of Appeal had to deal for the first time with a case involving a 
dispute over a child of a (lesbian) same-sex couple.
2
  Firstly, in granting the appellant, 
Ms. W’s request for a joint residence order, so as she could indirectly acquire parental 
responsibility, the case can be commended for affording recognition to same-sex 
relationships and parenting.  Secondly, and perhaps less obviously, the Court of 
Appeal’s ruling should be applauded for similarly recognising social parenting and 
active care-giving from non-biological parents, such as Ms. W.  Thirdly, having 
commanded unanimous agreement, Lord Justice Thorpe’s leading judgment stands as 
a cogent judicial statement in support of the statutory trend towards relaxing the 
traditional parenthood and family-form boundaries, which legislation like the 
Children Act 1989 (under which this case was to be decided) has served to entrench.
3
  
However, the relaxation of traditional boundaries, especially in the context of the 
                                                 
1
 Re. G (Children) [2005] E.W.C.A. (Civ) 462, hereinafter Re. G. 
2
 Previous cases such as G v F (shared residence:  parental responsibility) [1998] 3 F.C.R 1, have only 
been tried in the lower level courts.  This particular case questioned the correct criteria to be applied to 
an application for leave to apply for a shared residence order in respect of a child, after a lesbian 
cohabiting couple separated.   
3
 See Thorpe, L.J., Re.G, supra n.1, at para. 7.  While Thorpe L.J. was referring specifically to the 
relaxation of the original s.4 boundaries of the Children Act, this notion can be given a more general 
application if we consider new reforming legislation such as the Adoption and Children Act 2002 and 
the Civil Partnership Act 2004. 
 3 
valorisation of the ‘sexual family’ model4 and non-biological parenthood, is far from 
total and ‘non-standard’ families and parents continue to struggle for recognition.  I 
want therefore in this note, to firstly review the facts and legal issues raised and to 
elaborate some of the consequential and derivative legal problems which emerge, 
particularly for social parents.  Secondly, I want to offer some analysis of why the 
case should be welcomed in the three contexts outlined above, but to simultaneously 
voice some reservations about the extent to which ‘family diversity’ really has been 
given recognition by the case.  I will argue that while the trend of extending legal 
recognition to non-standard families remains based on the extent to which they reflect 
the ‘sexual family’, traditional ‘family’ boundaries can never be totally relaxed, 
despite notable legal victories such as Re. G. 
 
  
THE FACTS AND LEGAL ISSUES 
 
The appellant, Ms. W, and the respondent, Ms. G, were in a relationship from August 
1995, cohabiting until May 2003, whereupon they separated.  During the course of 
their relationship, Ms. G and Ms. W had two daughters together, M and M, born 2 
February 1999 and 26 June 2001.  Ms. G was the full biological mother of both 
children, who were conceived through anonymous donor insemination.  While Ms. G 
was the children’s main carer, Ms. W played a substantial part in their early lives, 
both in respect to their day-to-day care, and in the formation of their ‘kinship’ identity.  
She was, effectively, their co-mother, or social parent.  This fact was nowhere 
disputed in the history of the case.  The report of the CAFCASS officer stated, “…the 
                                                 
4
 See Fineman (1995).  This will be discussed further infra. 
 4 
importance and value of Ms. W’s role in their lives needs to be acknowledged…”5, 
while Judge Hughes’ reserved written judgment from the trial proceedings of 2004 
contained the following in the concluding paragraph: “….Miss W is a significant 
figure in their [M and M’s] lives and….her important place both historically and in 
the future can be maintained and reinforced by good quality frequent contact.” 6  
Despite this recognition, the trial judge did not award Ms. W the requested joint 
residence order for the younger child.  That Ms. W had only to request a joint 
residence order for the younger child deserves some elaboration.   
 
Firstly, it should be noted that the law distinguishes between the status of being a 
parent and the power to act as a parent.
7
  The former can be further divided into what 
Andrew Bainham has described as legal parentage and legal parenthood.
8
  He uses 
parentage to refer to the genetic connection(s), and parenthood to refer to the legal 
parent(s).
9
  Whilst often these will be held by the same person(s), adoption and 
assisted reproduction demonstrate the usefulness of his taxonomy, especially if we 
consider the growing legal emphasis of a child’s ‘right’ to knowledge about their 
origins and genetic parents.
10
  The latter—the power to act as a parent—is gained by 
acquiring ‘parental responsibility’ under the auspices of the Children Act 1989.  
                                                 
5
 Re. G, supra n.1, at para. 9, per Thorpe L.J. 
6
 Ibid, para. 16 
7
 See Barton and Douglas (1995), pp.49-50. 
8
 See Bainham (1999), pp.25-46. 
9
 Which, it should be noted, he does not limit to two persons (ie. one male, one female).  The historic 
need for male-female intercourse for reproduction, and the development (especially since Western 
industrialisation) of what Martha Fineman has described as the privatised, ‘sexual family’, have 
coupled to make persistent a model of parentage and parenthood whereby children are entitled to one 
parent of each sex, but no more, and sometimes, less (see the fatherlessness clause in s.28 of the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990).  See Fineman, supra n.4.  This two-parent framework 
will be critiqued further infra.  
10
 This trend can be evidenced by the growth of ‘open adoptions’, and the fact that since April 1st 2005, 
gamete donors must provide identifying information, to which the children, born from their gametes, 
will be entitled to obtain, upon reaching 18.  Bainham also draws attention to international law, 
especially Articles 7(1) and 8(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which he 
suggests acknowledge the child’s fundamental right to establish connections with his or her genetic 
parents.  Bainham, supra n.8, pp.36-39. 
 5 
Whilst its framework is clearly modeled on the heterosexual two-parent family,
11
 it 
does have the flexibility to recognise a multiplicity of de facto parenting situations.
12
  
Also, it is not necessary to have legal parentage or parenthood to have parental 
responsibility.   
 
This brings us to the second point of elaboration.  The method for obtaining parental 
responsibility varies between different categories of ‘parent’, and especially between 
those ‘parents’ whose role and/or connection is chiefly social, as opposed to those 
with a genetic and/or legal parenthood connection.  For example, it is automatic for all 
mothers and fathers married to the child’s mother,13 whilst unmarried (genetic) fathers 
may acquire it through jointly registering the child’s birth with the mother, 14  or 
through a formal parental responsibility agreement with the child’s mother or the 
court.
15
  Given recent legislative changes, step-parents and civil partners will soon 
similarly be entitled to apply directly for parental responsibility through an explicit 
clause in the Act.
16
  However, even with these reforms, some categories of ‘parent’ 
will remain outside such boundaries.  These parents will include, for example, social 
parents who are not in a legally recognised partnership with a parent who already has 
parental responsibility or an egg donor who is the intended co-parent of a child bore 
by another woman, and conceived using the sperm of the birth mother’s partner.   
 
                                                 
11
 See Sheldon (2001). 
12
 For example, s.3(5) permits a person who does not have parental responsibility, but who does have 
care of the child, to do what is reasonable in the circumstances for the purposes of safeguarding the 
child’s safety or welfare.  
13
 S.2.  Note that while the legislation refers to ‘mothers’, we must qualify this with the term 




 S.4(1)(b) or (c) respectively. 
16
 S.12 of the Adoption and children Act 2002 will insert a new s.4A into the Children Act which will 
provide for the acquisition of parental responsibility by a step-parent, while s.75(2) of the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004 will insert into s.4A(1) the words, “or a civil partner of” immediately after the 
words “is married to”. 
 6 
Thirdly then, parents outside the legislatively prescribed boundaries, have two options 
in seeking to obtain parental responsibility.  These ‘options’ are more onerous and 
much less certain than those for biological parents, or for those adults who are legally 
connected to an already recognised parent.
17
  By virtue of s.10(5)(b) of the Children 
Act, if they have lived with the child “for a period of at least three years” they are 
entitled to apply for a residence order, as defined in s.8.  If a residence order is 
obtained, parental responsibility, under the terms of s.12(2) is then automatically 
granted, although with notable prohibitions in relation to agreeing to, or refusing an 
adoption order, and in appointing a guardian.
18
  It can also be revoked by the court 
and expires when a child reaches the age of majority.  When a person has not lived 
with a child for three years—as was the case with Ms. W and the younger daughter, 
who was only two years old when Ms. W and Ms. G separated—they must either rely 
on the consent of all those already with parental responsibility,
19
 or the court’s 
discretion under s.10 to award a residence order, so as to obtain, again indirectly, 
parental responsibility. 
 
We see then why obtaining parental responsibility for the younger daughter was at 
issue in the case.  Ms. W was not entitled to apply for a (joint) residence order as with 
the older daughter, and had instead to appeal, from the outset,
20
 to the court’s 
discretion to grant the Order.  As mentioned, this was denied at trial level.  The judge 
instead issued a sole residence order to Ms. G, attaching to it a series of s.8 specific 
                                                 
17
 While child protection arguments will be put forward to justify these more onerous requirements, 
that such considerations are not similarly stressed for biological parents is somewhat concerning.  This 






 While the court still has the ultimate authority to award or deny the order, the point is that certain 
categories of parent have the direct right to apply, while others must be given permission to apply by 
the court. 
 7 
issue orders, “which were designed to ensure that the appellant retained a significant 
role in the lives of the children.”21  It was this refusal which was appealed to the upper 
court, the appellant’s counsel describing the resulting order “as but a pale shadow” of 
what Ms. W had requested.
22
  Ultimately, she was denied the ability to obtain parental 
responsibility. 
 
Why then is obtaining this legal status so important?  While some commentators have 
questioned the importance of parental responsibility for de facto parenting,
23
 it is an 
important practical and symbolic legal concept in the context of family relations.  
Parental responsibility is defined in s.3(1) of the Children Act as, “….all the rights, 
duties and powers, responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a child has 
in relation to the child and his property,” and its regulation must be in accordance 
with the guiding principle of the Act, the welfare of the child.
24
  Sally Sheldon has 
acknowledged several reasons why parental responsibility is important.
25
  Firstly, it 
allows an adult to take important decisions regarding a child’s upbringing, to include 
where they shall live, how they shall be educated, what religion (if any) they shall be 
brought up in, what non-essential medical treatment they shall receive, and to 
administer the child’s property.26  Parental responsibility may be held by more than 
one person simultaneously,
27
 and while a person holding parental responsibility can 
act alone on many issues, important decisions relating to, for example, the child’s 
home or education, need the consent of usually all those holding parental 
                                                 
21
 Per Thorpe L.J., Re. G, supra n.1, para. 4. 
22
 Ibid, para. 17. 
23
 See Eekelaar (2001).  His arguments seem sound in instances where the parents are working together, 
but where they disagree, to not have parental responsibility makes de facto parenting difficult indeed. 
24
 See s.1. 
25
 Sheldon, supra n.11, pp.94-95. 
26
 See further Barton and Douglas, supra n.7, p.114 for a more detailed list of the rights included within 




responsibility for the child.
28
  Secondly, Sheldon notes that parental responsibility can 
act as a spring-board for entitlement to other legal rights related to family policy, such 
as work-leave.
29
  Finally, she notes that parental responsibility accords the right to be 
heard in proceedings regarding a child’s emigration, and to appoint a guardian for the 
child upon one’s death.30  Thus parental responsibility can be viewed as the first step 
to obtaining other ‘parental rights’. 
 
With this brief outline, we begin to see the importance of securing parental 
responsibility if a parent is to have a substantial role in the child’s upbringing, and 
proper legal involvement in the child’s life.  While in many instances de facto 
parenting will take place without this legal formality, in cases like Re. G where the 
adults involved have ended an intimate relationship and are in disagreement over 
significant issues, the practical salience of parental responsibility cannot be 
underestimated.  Indeed, the central disagreement in Re. G was the fundamental 
question of Ms. W’s status as the child’s parent.  With no genetic connection to the 
child, her ex-partner wanted her role confined to that of “an extended family member, 
not in a parental position.”31  As even the trial judge recognised, there was a clear 
attempt by Ms. G to marginalise Ms. W’s role, culminating in a proposed move from 




 See for example the Maternity and Parental Leave etc. Regulations 1999 (S.I. 1999 No.3312), 
whereby persons either recognised as a parent on the birth certificate and/or persons having parental 
responsibility can apply for the leave to care for a child, under qualified conditions. 
30
 S.13 and 5(3) respectively. 
31
 Per Thorpe, L.J., Re. G supra n.1 at para. 11.  Note how Ms. G’s statement here supports the rhetoric 
from traditional family rights and religious groups who spoke about the case in the media.  For 
example, Dr. Adrian Rogers, an adviser to the Family Focus group said, “These two children are the 
wrong age to be brought up by a lesbian couple.  This woman has no genetic link to the children, she is 
just someone who has spent time with them,” Pilditch (2005).  See also Norman Wells, of Family and 
Youth Concern, who said, “The female friends of a child’s mother may well become significant figures 
in a child’s life, but they can never provide an adequate substitute for the child’s father and it is a 
mistake to pretend that they can,” Dolan (2005). 
 9 
Shropshire to Cornwall.  The trial judge found that, “….the proposed move must in 
part be deliberately designed to frustrate current contact arrangements.”32 
 
Why then did the trial judge decline from indirectly granting parental responsibility, 
by granting the joint residence order as recommended by the CAFCASS officer 
assigned to the case?
33
  The trial judge is quoted as saying: 
 
In my view such a sharing of parental responsibility would result in endless disputes between 
the parties which may require the Court’s intervention to resolve issues of education, 
accommodation, elective medical procedures and so forth which could not be in the long term 
interests of these children.  A recent consultation document from CAFCASS encourages its 
officers to consider shared residence orders where parental cooperation and practical 
circumstances allow and it appear to be in the child’s interests.  This does not seem to me to 




Her decision then seems to rest on the conviction that as the appellant and respondent 
had a hostile relationship, a joint residence order and shared parental responsibility 
would be unworkable and that therefore it was better to grant sole residence, and 
proscribe certain actions, such as the planned move to Cornwall.  This stands in 
contrast to the CAFCASS officer’s optimistic belief “that the animosity between the 
parties would dissipate over time.”35  While this view remains speculative, the trial 
judge seemed to gloss over, indeed omit an important point – that it is when the 
parents’ relationship is acrimonious, that the holding of parental responsibility 
becomes all the more significant.   
                                                 
32
 Per Thorpe, L.J., Re. G supra n.1 at para. 14, quoting Hughes, J. 
33
 See Re. G, ibid, at para. 9. 
34
 Per Thorpe, L.J., supra n.32.  Note that neither counsel was able to find the CAFCASS document 
that Hughes J. was referring to. 
35
 Per Thorpe L.J., Re. G supra n.1, at para. 13. 
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In acknowledging this however, I am not suggesting that the nature of the animosity 
should be disregarded.  In too many cases, such ‘animosity’ is based on domestic 
violence, other harmful power struggles, or it may involve a primary carer trying to 
restrict the access of a dangerous, irresponsible or feckless parent in order to (justly) 
protect the physical and/or psychological welfare of the child.  In these cases, it would 
generally not be in the best interests of the child and/or a primary carer, who is a 
victim of such, to award a joint order.  Indeed, where there is base-line evidence that 
such a scenario exists, I would suggest that the case merits a rebuttable exemption 
from the ‘fit-parent’ framework I suggest below.  The trends in US law of ‘failure-to-
protect’ and ‘friendly-parent’ provisions36 highlight the perverse legal results which 
can emerge if the dynamics of domestic violence (in its many forms) are not 
understood and addressed appropriately by legislation and the Courts.  In cases which 
do not have such a dimension, where the person seeking the order has actively 
demonstrated themselves to be a ‘fit-parent’, their entitlement to parental 
responsibility should not hinge upon the co-operation of another parent.  To indulge in 
clichés, their ability to parent should not be ‘held to ransom’ by an obstructive co-
parent.   
 
If parental fitness is to be used as a judicial standard, it would have to somehow be 
statutorily defined, in order to prevent it from being used as a vehicle for judicial 
                                                 
36
 Most US States have now codified a ‘failure to protect’ standard in their child protective statutes and 
apply these provisions to victims of domestic violence by charging them with neglect for failing to 
remove their children from violent surroundings.  See case such as Cathy G. (detailed in Miccio, K., 
1999) and In Re. Dalton 424 N.E.2d. 1226 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).  A perpetrator of domestic violence, 
under a ‘friendly parent’ provision can seem much more conciliatory and willing to co-operate than a 
parent who has been victimised by the perpetrator.  If a judge then fails to take into consideration the 
domestic violence, the victim parent’s refusal not to co-operate with the abusive parent makes them 
appear obstructive. 
 11 
prejudice and stereotypes.  I suggest that, where appropriate, the chief consideration 
for the ‘fit-parent’ criteria should be evidence of the applicant’s productive and active 
involvement in caring for the child.
37
  Other proposed standards have included the 
Equal Parenting Council’s ‘good reason principle’ - that a parent should be deemed 
‘fit’, unless there is a good reason, supported by credible evidence, why this parent’s 
role should be excluded or restricted that would apply even if the parents were 
together.
38
  While I can understand the Council’s logic in purporting this standard, 
given the argument that separated parents are held to ‘higher standards’ than non-
separated parents, such a principle perhaps remains too speculative and subjective for 
a judicial standard in this area.  For example, is being a perpetrator of domestic 
violence a currently acknowledged reason to deem a parent ‘unfit’ if they are still with 
the other parent?  Similarly, would a person’s sexuality be considered a sufficiently 
‘good reason’?  As the law remains unclear about the ‘good reasons’ why parents 
should be deemed ‘unfit’ when they are together, a standard which focuses more on 
actual parenting skills through a broad construct of active ‘care’ would charge judges 
with considering true ‘parental fitness’.  It could also be reinforced with a list of 
prohibited considerations, such as gender, sexuality and race, and perhaps some 
indicative guidance on what active ‘care’ could incorporate. 
 
As a final point, implicit in this ‘holding to ransom’ discussion, is that obstructive co-
parents, where the animosity is not merited, should be better policed and sanctioned 
by the courts.  To elaborate specifically on how such should be done in practice is 
                                                 
37
 This could clearly be applied in the specific to cases such as Re. G.  More generally however, I 
would suggest that as parenting behaviours are not completely a matter of ‘choice’ (for example, only 
women remain entitled to extended maternity leave, while men have only two weeks paternity leave), 
‘care’ should be given a broad definition, and should not be restricted entirely to the day-to-day care of 
a child. 
38
 Equal Parenting Council (2003). 
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beyond the scope of this note.  However, given, for example, complaints about the 
family court system from father’s rights groups—which are currently shaping up quite 
divisively for parenthood
39—there is pressing need for this ‘holding to ransom’ to be 
disparaged by the courts.  It is needed not only because it is morally reprehensible, but 
also because, if left unaddressed, it risks being used as an argument for the promotion 
and adaptation of de-contextualised and homogenous provisions, such as 
presumptions of joint residence upon parental separation. 
 
While I have not elaborated on how courts could perhaps better manage obstructive 
parents, the current Government has made recent attempts.  Getting back to the case, 
in his concluding paragraph, Thorpe L.J. referred to the Government’s recent 
consultation paper, and their publication of the draft Children (Contact) and Adoption 
Bill, designed to introduce new powers and management techniques for judges to 
combat ‘obstructive’ behaviour.  A solid body of case-law, like Re. G, which 
facilitates and encourages the granting of joint orders and parental responsibility to 
‘fit parents’ through a recognition of their active ‘care’, would be an encouraging and 
supportive judiciary-based compliment to these, hopefully positive, Government 
initiatives.  Indeed, it may help to progressively shape their final form in a way that is 
socially textured as opposed to prejudiced or stereotypical.   
 
In this first part of the note I have dealt with the specific legal issues of the case, and 
elaborated more broadly on some of the important derivative issues, particularly in the 
context of legally recognising social parents.  Drawing attention to both the problems 
of the parental responsibility framework under the Children Act and the importance of 
                                                 
39
 For example, increased rhetoric of ‘mother-blaming’ and feminist bias, are replacing substantive 
critiques about a system which fails both mothers and fathers.  
 13 
this legal category, especially where the parents separate and disagree over crucial 
issues, I have tried to suggest a workable and progressive standard that judges should 
use when a parent must appeal to their discretion if they are to be allowed to apply for, 
and obtain, parental responsibility.  Although the ‘fit-parent’ standard cannot be 
applied homogenously as it has the clear potential to be manipulated in certain 
circumstances, if defined appropriately, it would be a useful judicial tool in many 
‘separation’ cases.  A definition based on a workable construct of ‘care’ has, I suggest, 
the potential to discourage and disrupt the use of stereotypes, particularly those based 
upon gender and sexuality, which have so often been used in a prejudiced manner in 
assigning ‘parental rights’ and legal entitlements.40 
 
 
COMMENDING RE. G 
 
Whilst the preceding section has addressed the legal hurdles that Ms. W had to 
surpass in order to obtain parental responsibility under the current legislative 
framework, what I want to discuss in this section are the more positive aspects of Re. 
G and Lord Justice Thorpe’s written judgment.  However, in some instances I suggest 
that these are not without their specific shortcomings. 
 
Firstly, the case must be seen as a positive step in the more general struggle of 
obtaining legal recognition for same-sex relationships and parenting.  Essentially, Re. 
G has extended some important existent case-law to same-sex parents, which until 
now had only been applied to heterosexual parents.  In his judgment, Thorpe, L.J. 
                                                 
40
 For example, lesbian mothers have historically been denied parental rights on the basis of their 
sexuality, as opposed to any real question of their ‘parental fitness’.  
 14 
aligns three main bodies of authority in justifying his award of joint residence.  Firstly, 
he refers to the case of A v A
41
, and the intractable disputes between the parents, Mr. 
and Mrs. A.  Whilst the respondent’s counsel sought to distinguish this case on the 
basis that Mr. and Mrs. A had been married, and thus had automatic parental 
responsibility,
42
 Thorpe L.J. applied the case as a point of general principle that courts 
should encourage co-operation between acrimonious parents.  He cited Wall, J. (as he 
then was): 
 
Control is not what this family needs.  What it needs is co-operation.  By making a shared 
residence order the court is making that point.  These parents have joint and equal parental 
responsibility.  The residence of the children is shared between them.  These facts need to be 




Wall, J. thought that making a sole residence order in favour of Mr. A. would be 
misinterpreted, despite his personal belief that Mr. A. would honour the necessary 
arrangements.  In the context of Re. G then, the lesser award made by Hughes, J. 
would, under this authority, be tantamount to endorsing Ms. G’s attempts to ‘control’ 
Ms. W’s relationship with M.  In awarding a joint residence order and thus parental 
responsibility, Thorpe L.J. instead offered the clear message that Ms. W was the equal 
parent of M, and that Ms. G needed to co-operate with her, whether they were 
‘married’ or not. 
 
The second body of authority refers to applications for parental responsibility.  Most 
of the case-law involving parental responsibility applications refers to unmarried 
                                                 
41
 A v A (Shared Residence) [2004] 1 FLR 1195, hereinafter A v A. 
42




fathers’ requests for parental responsibility orders (PROs).  In brief, a three-fold 
criterion of ‘commitment, attachment and motivation’ has emerged as a guide for 
whether or not a PRO should be awarded.
44
  Thorpe L.J. also draws attention to the 
more recent authority, which emphasises “the benefits to be achieved for a child by 
the grant of parental responsibility to both parents”.45  In support, whilst PROs are not 
simply granted to unmarried fathers upon request, they have been typically awarded 
unless there is a strong reason as to why they should not be.  As Wall J. said: 
 
….wherever possible, the law should confer on a concerned father that stamp of approval 
because he has shown himself willing and anxious to pick up the responsibility of fatherhood 




What Thorpe L.J. has established in Re. G, is that this standard or ‘threshold’ should 
be similarly applied, in the specific, to same-sex parents-  “….what Ward L.J. had to 
say of fathers is of application to same sex parents.”47  Thorpe L.J. refers to pivotal 
cases, the third body of authority, which trace judicial acceptance of ‘family diversity’.  
These include Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd.,
48
 and the recent 
Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza.
49
  By family diversity, he is referring to same-sex couples, 
who have historically been denied both rights of legal recognition, and parenthood 
status where they are the non-biological parent.  However, the recognition of same-
sex relationships is modeled on the exclusive heterosexual couple.  While this may be 
the case for many non-heterosexual relationships, it continues to deny recognition to 
                                                 
44
 See Bainham (2005) pp.205-210. 
45
 Per Thorpe, L.J., Re. G supra n.1 at para. 22, referring to the judgment of Ward L.J. in Re C and V 
[1998] 1 FLR 392. 
46
 Ibid, at page 397.  Note that refusals to grant PROs have been rare.  See further Sheldon (2001), 
pp.103-4. 
47
 Per Thorpe, L.J., Re. G supra n.1 at para. 22. 
48
 Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd. [2001] 1 AC 27, hereinafter Fitzpatrick v Sterling. 
49
 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 3 WLR 113, herinafter Mendoza Case. 
 16 
various others, and has been an important criticism of recent legislative reforms, 
especially the Civil Partnership Act 2004.
 50
  Therefore, whilst Re. G is an important 
break-through for same-sex couples who have children, in that their sexuality must 
become irrelevant to the existent and future case-law relating to parental 
responsibility, it is perhaps only the beginning of a longer process of truly recognising 
‘family diversity’.  
 
To demonstrate, as Ms. W was a non-biological parent, it could be argued that Thorpe 
L.J. has further broadened the ‘threshold’ precedent to include all social parents who 
seek parental responsibility through clauses such as s.10 of the Children Act.  
However, the extent of this recognition, in line with how same-sex relationships are 
being recognised more generally, may depend on how closely the ‘family unit’ 
resembles the heterosexual and privatised two-parent model, or what Martha Fineman 
has termed, ‘the sexual family’ 51 .  For example, would a ‘third’ parent, in a 
collaborative family (sexually connected or otherwise) be afforded similar treatment 
under similar circumstances, or is the ‘threshold’ reserved for “….homosexual 
couple[s] whose relationship is marriage-like in the same ways that unmarried 
heterosexual couple’s relationship is marriage-like and indeed in an analogous 
situation”?52 
 
This then introduces us, somewhat ironically through a criticism, to what I described 
as the second commendable aspect of the Re. G judgment.  In brief, and subject to the 
same ‘sexual family’ criticism, the ruling in Re. G gave equal recognition to a parent, 
whose status was based, in the main, on social care-taking factors as opposed to 
                                                 
50
 See Barker (2004). 
51
 Fineman, supra n.4. 
52
 Per Baroness Hale, Mendoza Case, supra n.48 at para. 143. 
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biological connections.  While of course Ms. W’s status was further based on her 
intimate relationship connection to Ms. G (thus the ‘sexual family’ criticism) it is still 
a powerful judicial statement in support and recognition of social parenting. It is 
important to recognise this.  Recent reforms to the Children Act will soon provide 
new mechanisms for civil partners and step-parents to apply directly for parental 
responsibility.
53
  However, social parents who are not in a legally recognised union 
with a parent who already has parental responsibility, will still have to rely on being 
granted a joint residence order if they are to obtain parental responsibility.  Under Re. 
G then, where a person applying for a joint residence order, be it through the three-
year requirement or the court’s discretionary powers, if they satisfy the ‘commitment, 
attachment and motivation’ threshold, 54  and it is in the child’s interest, parental 
responsibility cannot be denied on the basis that there is no biological connection. 
 
One final commendable point is that this decision was reached unanimously.  The two 
other Lord Justices agreed, without reservation to Lord Justice Thorpe’s judgment in 
upholding the appeal.  This then lends strong support to the case being used positively 
for future cases similarly involving same-sex and/or social parents.  While we must 
rely on the incremental development of the common law to extend the precedent to 
those families and parenthood situations which are fashioned on the traditional 
‘sexual family’ model, the potential impact of the case should not be underestimated.  
The traditional assumptions about parenthood, which prize the marital family unit, 
biological connections, as well as privatised care and gendered parenting roles, are 
deeply ingrained in Western cultures.
55
  So while Re. G does not perhaps disrupt all 
                                                 
53
 See supra n. 12. 
54
 Preventing applications from baby-sitters, acquaintances and so forth, as opposed to actual ‘social 
parents’.  
55
 See Fineman, supra n.9. 
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these assumptions, it is a notable challenge which, at the least, aligns judicial thinking 
with recent statutory reforms, and at best, provides a legal avenue into further relaxing 
current boundary-based definitions of parenthood and families, in favour of redefining 
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